Never get involved in a land war in Asia
Excuse me while I dust off my history degree for a moment…
No one’s ever successfully done it. The British tried it three times between 1838 and 1919. The Soviets tried three times between 1929 and 1979. The United States’ attempt starting in 2001 that’s currently ending is going about as well.
The only winning move was not to play.
Joe Biden is the one taking the political hit for the relative failure of the US’s withdrawl from Afghanistan, with the Taliban moving in to unseat the government the nation helped establish and the chaos we’re seeing on the news these last few days, though *any* President who presided over a withdrawal (even if the last one and his ilk are are pretending he wasn’t on exactly the same track) would face a similar situation. The political philosophies of western civilization never took hold in that part of the world; thus, the traditional methods of the world’s modern Western colonial superpowers (and in this case, I’m including the Soviet Union in this category; Marx and The Communist Manifesto came out of Germany and was based on principles of Western thought) to “democratize” or “westernize” the region are doomed to fail; the Afghan people and their neighbors in Central Asia look at the world through an entirely different lens.
I will concede that I’m certainly not an expert on Central Asia and it’s people, though I’ve studied enough in the academic context to have a general understanding. Afghanistan’s culture isn’t organized around the concept of nations and democracy; the culture of the region operates on a much more personal level; it’s a tribally-organized society where connections based on kinship and associations in the local community matter more than statecraft. The succession of Western powers hoping to influence the region never understood that. The reason that, apart from media images of Bagram this weekend, the Taliban’s takeover has been largely bloodless has to do more with local agreements between communities with a tradition of meetings with tribal leaders on all sides finding common ground and making small-scale deals in order to get by in life in an environment that is sometimes less than hospitable. As described in the article above and in this interesting opinion piece, arrangements have existed since time immemorial that keep the peace between non-combatant and revolutionary elements at the local level. In fact, in many cases, Taliban/Mujahedeen have done more to assist local communities obtain resources and security than the government in Kabul – given these conditions, it’s less surprising that the Taliban takeover of the country has been swift and largely peaceful.
While the United States did not accomplish it’s mission of establishing a democratized Afghanistan, with any progress it made toward that goal being rapidly undone, I personally believe, as the Biden administration is publicly stating, that getting out is in the best interest of the country. In short, it’s a case of, to use the colloquialism, “throwing good money after bad.” History and experience show that the goal established by the Bush II administration back in 2001 was a flawed one (and was motivated in great measure by emotional thoughts of vengeance by a wounded nation). While it disappoints and angers American exceptionalists to admit mistakes or failure, no individual or nation is perfect, and it’s rational to recognize errors in judgement and take corrective measures, and if necessary, cut one’s losses.
That’s my interpretation of the Biden administration’s actions here; staying the course regarding the withdrawal and standing by the decision. The President’s remarks yesterday spoke to the history of the conflict, and cited the actions of those who came before him that contributed to the current situation, but is taking responsibility (“The buck stops with me”) for ending it, and owning the political fallout, because it’s the least bad decision to be made. Maybe this is his legacy in the end; who knows. This might be his signal that he’s not going to seek a second term. Whatever comes next, I don’t think it’s a mistake to commit to not not passing the conflict on to a fifth President.
There was no good way to get out of this one. But getting out was the right call. There’s little honor in kicking the can, but there might be in making an ugly, but rational decision to stop digging.
I can think of worse legacies.